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A. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism,
whether it is of foreign or domestic origin has become the prime focus of t=
he
nation, because of the actions of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath. T=
he
federal government has declared war on terrorism. State and local authoriti=
es
are in the process of marshaling all available resources to assist the fede=
ral
government in the prevention, control, and resolution of acts of terrorism.=
The
C/WLEPC, for several years, has recognized that Terrorism is one of the 24
viable emergencies that could impact Cabell and Wayne Counties, and it has =
had
a basic plan for the prevention and control of terrorism in place. But with=
the
additional knowledge gained about the subject since September 11, 2001, this
plan has been expanded to allow the C/WLEPC and its member organizations to
become more knowledgeable of the subject, so that emphasis can be on pro-ac=
tive
measures, rather than only reactive ones.
Effective
terrorism control and prevention is dependent upon the coordination of
emergency management, emergency communications, emergency response, and
facility management in a manner that can prevent and control terrorism. Each
terrorism situation will be different, but the principles in this Plan will
ensure the implementation of the best possible prevention, control, and
resolution measures.
Information
in the other C/WLEPC Plans and in the Cabell County and Wayne County Emerge=
ncy
Operations Plans may impact on this Terrorism Prevention and Control Plan.
Where appropriate, they should be used in conjunction with this Plan. Likew=
ise
the Terrorism Prevention and Control Plan, where appropriate, should be use=
d in
conjunction with other C/WLEPC plans and the Emergency Operations Plans of
Cabell and Wayne Counties.
The
purpose of this Plan is to provide a background on terrorism and to outline
possible actions to be taken to prevent, control and resolve terrorism
activities and to assure the coordinated efforts of the involved relevant
emergency management, emergency communications, emergency response, and
facility security organizations that would be involved.
Significant
facts about terrorism emergency management taken from the highly detailed
Cabell County and Wayne County Emergency Operations Plans Annex on Terrorism
has been included because of the unique legal requirements impacting such
management. These facts should be interpreted within the overall subject An=
nex
on Terrorism.
Terrorism
control activities would concern persons at work directly and persons worki=
ng,
traveling,
or living adjacent to a governmental, non-profit, or private facility that
could be impacted by terrorism activity.
In order to focus on
potential problems in the Cabell/Wayne Emergency Planning District related =
to
terrorism, certain background information should be considered:
1.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Public util=
ities
facilities offer prime targets for terrorism.
2.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Facilities
involved with Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHSs) offer prime potential
targets for terrorism.
3.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Significant
municipal, county, state and federal facilities provide prime targets for
terrorism, especially when the purpose is to mak=
e a
political statement against authority. Disruption of emergency management,
emergency communications, or emergency response activities that would be
involved in controlling a simultaneous sabotage or terrorism attempt with a
separate crime at another point qualifies them to be considered as prime
targets also.
4.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Schools and
hospitals, because of the perceived helplessness of students and patients, =
need
to be considered as potential targets.
5.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Labor/Manag=
ement
conflict actions (strikes, layoffs, etc.) may initiate domestic terrorism
activities that cannot only affect a facility and/or operation directly, but
may endanger the safety, health, and/or economy of a community indirectly.<=
o:p>
6.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Almost no
facility, whether in the public, non-profit, or private sector, is safe from
terrorists attacks when they are totally dedicated to an action, but much c=
an
be done by the management and security staffs of relevant private, non-prof=
it,
and public facilities to discourage terrorists from choosing a particular
facility as a target.
7.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Terrorists =
may be
members of politically motivated organizations, but also may be former or
present disgruntled employees, psychologically unbalanced individuals, memb=
ers
of ultra-right or ultra-left “rights”organizations, disgruntled
students, disgruntled patients, members or agents of organized crime, or
members of some organizations
expressing concerns about the environment and the perceived roles played by=
facilities
in matters concerning the environment, or a combination of two or more.
8.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Terrorism c=
an be
controlled by the physical safeguarding of facilities; security programming=
of
facilities; interaction (preventive and corrective actions) among
facility security personnel=
and
local, state and federal law enforcement agencies;
C. BACKGROUND
(Continued)
8. =
(Continued)
and internal and external intelligence. The greater the control factor, the
less attractive a facility to terrorists. Depending on the size and type of
facility, various components under the aforementioned controls would be
applicable.
9.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Facilities
occupied by large numbers of people, that are security vulnerable, such as stadiums, convention
centers, auditoriums, major office buildings, major shopping malls, =
high schools, higher education dormitories and m=
ajor
classroom facilities, major motels, etc., need to be considered as prime
targets for possible terrorist attacks.
10.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
The general
objective of individuals or groups interested in carrying out threats or
actions of terrorism is to create a climate of fear and intimidation as a m=
eans
to achieve social, political, or personal, including financial, goals.
11.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Terrorist a=
cts
could include the threat and/or the commission of placement of explosives a=
t a
site, transmission of an explosive via a portable weapon (rifle, missile
launcher, mortar, etc.), transmission of an explosive by a person willing to
commit suicide, initiating and explosion by ramming a motor vehicle or airp=
lane
into the target, placing an explosive in an abandoned parked motor vehicle,
ignition of a nuclear device, ignition of a “Dirty Bomb”, relea=
se
of a bio-terrorism agent in gaseous, liquid, or granular form, and
assassination of key political figures.
12.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Terrorist a=
cts
could have secondary effects, such as the disruption of transportation syst=
ems
by destroying key elements (bridges, overpasses, tunnels, rail terminals,
airport runways, etc.
13.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Terrorist a=
cts
could be waterborne from the Ohio and Big Sandy Rivers against facilities in
Cabell and Wayne Counties, or against facilities in Kentucky or Ohio
&nbs=
p; that
would have a direct impact on the C/WLEPD. While, the US Coast Guard has be=
en
assigned additional responsibilities for Homeland Security matters on navig=
able
waterways, the C/WLEPC and its relevant members need to work closely with t=
he
US Coast Guard to attempt to prevent acts of terrorism against such facilit=
ies.
14.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
There are
distinct laws and regulations that impact how the threat or occurrence of a=
cts
of terrorism or sabotage are managed.
15.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
A terrorist=
or
sabotage incident may occur with little or no advanced warning.
16.&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Though, by =
law,
federal and State organizations may ultimately assume management control du=
ring
the Crisis Management phase of a terrorism incident, and to a lesser
C. BACKGROUND (Continued)=
&nbs=
p; 16. (Cont=
inued)
extent the Consequence Management phase of a terrorism, local emergency
management, communications, response, and support agencies should have the
capability to manage at least the initial Crisis Management stage and a
significant portion of the Consequence Management stage of a terrorism
incident.
D. &n=
bsp; INTERACTION
BETWEEN FACILITY SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Interaction
between those persons at principal public and private sector facilities res=
ponsible
for security (whether full time security personnel or supervisory personnel
where no formal security unit exists) and local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies, as well as appropriate emergency management personnel,
emergency communications personnel, and emergency response personnel, is
critical to a sound Terrorism Prevention and Control Plan. Such interacting
includes to the greatest extent possible:
1.&=
nbsp; The
identification of possible sabotage and terrorism targets. As a start the
“Covered Facilities” list under SARA Title III, supplemented by
other obvious facilities (fuel refining/distribution/storage facilities; wa=
ter
and wastewater, electrical, telephone, and natural gas utilities; major off=
ice
buildings; major education facilities; governmental buildings; mass gatheri=
ng
facilities, key transportation infrastructure locations, etc.) should be lo=
oked
at. Target facilities may be chosen by terrorists for themselves, the effec=
t on
the environment, the effect on the community, and/or the effect on the econ=
omy.
Such effects can be rational and/or psychological. Also see Appendix
“B”, Terrorism Primary Potential Targets in the C/WLEPD.
2. &n=
bsp; The
analysis of the application of the preventive concepts of physical safeguar=
ding
control and security programming discussed above in this Plan, applied to t=
he
primary potential terrorism targets.
3.&n=
bsp;  =
;
The design =
of
response programs for incidents at the primary potential terrorism targets.
These response programs should include the role, not only of law enforcement
agencies and emergency management and emergency communications personnel, b=
ut
of on-site security personnel, EMS, fire service personnel, and public heal=
th
and hospital personnel.
=
4. &n=
bsp; The
establishment of training programs for terrorism control involving those
personnel outlined in No. 3 above.
D. INTERACTION BETWEEN
FACILITY SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (Continued)
5. &n=
bsp; The
holding of drills involving those personnel mentioned in No. 4 above. Such
drills should not only be applied to principal private sector facilities, b=
ut
should also involve public utilities, governmental facilities, hospitals, a=
nd
public gathering facilities. Such drills should include tabletop and simula=
tion
exercises, as well as field exercises.
6.&=
nbsp; The
provision of a method of effectively updating the personnel mentioned in No=
. 3
above about relevant information concerning the rapidly developing federal
organization, laws, rules, regulations, guidelines, etc. having to do with
Homeland
Security. Such informati=
on can
be vital for effective cooperation, whether it be legally mandated or
voluntary. To a lesser extent, the same applies to relevant West Virginia
government operations involving homeland security.
E. =
INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence can be int= ernal or external; conventional or unconventional. Internal intelligence is conducted primarily by facility management, while external intelligence is conducted primarily by governmental law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Any
intelligence action taken by facility or governmental personnel must always=
be
taken legally. No intelligence action justifies illegal action of any
sort.
Internal
and external intelligence include:
1.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Analysis of
employee personnel files to the extent authorized by law.
2.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Interviewin=
g of
employees. This would include voluntary interviews and involuntary intervie=
ws,
the latter only within full compliance with all federal, state, and local
government statutes and regulations.
3.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Analysis of
activity reports in security sensitive physical and operational areas to de=
tect
any abnormal patterns of activity.
4.&n= bsp;  = ; Establishment of an inter-agency/inter-facility Terrorism Control Task Force made up of representatives from relevant governmental and facility security agencies w= hich would periodically provide and analyze relevant intelligence information obtained by members of the Task Force.
E. =
INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)
5.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Observation=
of
suspect individuals without their knowledge, keeping in mind all legal rest=
rictions
on such activity.
6.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Interceptio=
n of
verbal or written communications without the awareness of the suspect
individuals involved, keeping in mind all legal restrictions on such activi=
ty.
7.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Obtaining
“secure” information, documents or objects for analysis without=
the
permission of the suspect persons responsible for them, keeping in mind all
legal restrictions on such activities.
F. =
TERRORISM INCIDENTS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Because of federal and = West Virginia law and regulations, terrorism incidents emergency management is t= he exception to the normal emergency management utilized for other types of emergencies (hazards).
Phases of Emergency Man= agement For Terrorism Incidents
There are two distinct, but often overlapping ph=
ases
of terrorism emergency anagem=
ent.
They are the Crisis Management stage and the Consequence Management stage. =
Once
it has been determined by local emergency management personnel that an ille=
gal
act is involved in an incident of sabotage or terrorism, the two-phase
emergency management system is implemented, and West Virginia and federal l=
aw
and regulations take precedence.
&=
nbsp; 1. =
Crisis
Management
a. =
Initial
on-scene Crisis Management shall be the responsibility of a ranking member =
of
the police department or sheriff’s department having jurisdiction at =
the
Incident Site, who shall serve as the Incident Commander, until relieved by
higher authority, normally the WV State Police.
b.&=
nbsp; The
Incident Commander will request that the E-911 Communications Center notify=
the
WV State Police (WVSP) and the WV Division of Emergency Services and Homela=
nd
Security (WVDES and HS) of the terrorist incident, along with basic informa=
tion
gathered by the Incident Commander about the incident (as well as request t=
hat
the County Director of Emergency Services activates the Emergency Operations
Room (EOR)).
F. =
TERRORISM
INCIDENTS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Continued)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 1. =
Crisis
Management (Continued)
c.=
=
The
WVSP sends a Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF) to the ICP. The head of the
CMTF becomes the On-Scene Commander (OSC), and the former IC becomes a key
staff member at the Joint Operations Center (JOC), which replaces the ICP,
headed by the OSC.
d.=
=
At
the time the action in subsection “a.” above takes place, the W=
VDES
and HS will activate and appropriately staff the State Emergency Operations
Center (SEOC). The SEOC will liaise with the JOC and the County EOR.
e.=
=
At
the time the SEOC is activated, it will notify the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of t=
he
terrorism or sabotage incident.
f.=
=
Upon
arrival of the designated FBI representative at the JOC, that representative
becomes the OSC at the JOC, with the former WVSP OSC and members of the CMTF
and the former local government Incident Commander becoming key staff membe=
rs
at the JOC. The FBI OSC liaises with the SEOC and with the EOR as appropria=
te.
Representatives of the appropriate federal agencies join representatives of=
the
appropriate state agencies and local government agencies at the JOC as well=
as
the SEOC.
2. =
Consequence
Management
a. The
Consequence Management phase may begin at the same point as the Crisis
Management phase, during the Crisis Management phase, or at the end of the
Crisis Management phase.
= b. = The FBI OSC through federal channels may notify other federal agencies (includi= ng FEMA) of a significant terrorism threat, thereby allowing FEMA to implement standard procedures that shall alert other relevant federal agencies involv= ed in Consequence Management, and, if requested by the FBI OSC, shall deploy relevant representatives to the FBI JOC.
F. TERRORISM INCIDE=
NTS
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Continued)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 2. =
Consequence
Management (Continued)
c.&=
nbsp; If
a terrorism incident that produces major consequences occurs without warnin=
g, the
FBI and FEMA shall initiate Consequence
Management and Crisis Management actions concurr=
ently,
and FEMA shall immediately consult with the WVDES and HS to help determine =
the
scope of federal Consequence Management assistance.
d.&=
nbsp; The
State of West Virginia and the appropriate local government jurisdiction sh=
all
exercise the preeminent authority to make decisions impacting the consequen=
ces
of an act of terrorism. All a=
ctions
exercised under such authority will be coordinated with the FBI OSC within =
the
Unified Command at the JOC and SEOC.
e.=
=
During
the Consequence Management phase of the Incident, the federal government
agencies, coordinated by FEMA, for US DHS, shall provide assistance as requ=
ired
and as requested by the SEOC and the appropriate local government emergency
management personnel through the SEOC.
Note: &nb=
sp; The NIMS follows the above proceedings as an exc=
eption
to its other emergency response procedures.
1.&=
nbsp; EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES (DYNAMITE, TNT, C-4, SEMTEX, CHEMICAL, ETC.)
a.&=
nbsp; Via
direct device placement (hidden devices, non-hidden packages, luggage, etc.=
)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
b. Via m=
otor
vehicle placement (parked automobiles, trucks, vans, etc.)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
c. Via m=
oored
water vehicle (boats and barges, etc.)
d.&=
nbsp; Via
remote point origin (shoulder launched anti-tank/anti-aircraft rocket, rifl=
e,
grenade, etc.)
e. &n=
bsp; Advantages
of Explosive Devices
1. &n=
bsp; Relatively
easy to secure materials.
2. Relatively easy to assemble device.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
=
&nbs=
p; e. =
Advantages
of Explosive Devices (Continued)
3. Relat=
ively
east to place because of so many potential targets, especially those of low=
er
priority.
4. &n=
bsp; Low
risk of perpetrator being initially apprehended.
5. Low r=
isk of
perpetrator being killed or injured in process, providing perpetrator
understands device.
6. Can c=
reate
many casualties, depending on amount of explosive power in device, device
focus, and device placement.
7. May be
difficult to detect if comprehensive security measures are not in place at
target facility.
8. Suita=
ble
for use at all potential target facilities, whether large or small and whet=
her
high or low priority.
9. Threat alone can create panic at target facility and cause casualties.
10. &=
nbsp; Threat
alone can tie up valuable emergency management, emergency communications, a=
nd
emergency response personnel, thereby preventing other services to be rende=
red
ineffective manner and adding to the work stress of relevant emergency
personnel.
f. &n=
bsp; Explosive
Device Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
1. &nb=
sp; Placement
of an explosive device would be most likely at any relevant facility not ha=
ving
comprehensive terrorism prevention
measures in place.
2. &n=
bsp; TRANSPORTATION
MODE CRASHING
=
a=
. =
Via
motor vehicle with explosives and/or quantity of combustible fuel.
= <= o:p>
b. &n=
bsp; Via
airplane with explosives and/or quantity of combustible fuel.
= <= o:p>
c. &n=
bsp; Via
boat with explosives and/or quantity of combustible fuel.
= <= o:p>
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
2. =
TRANSPORTATION
MODE CRASHING (Continued)
d. &n=
bsp; Transportation
Mode Crashing Advantages
=
&nb=
sp; 1. =
All
logical listings under I. e. above.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&nbs=
p; 2. =
Effective
for large scale achievement, if terrorists have control of relevant
transportation mode and are willing to die for the
achievement.
3. &n=
bsp; Difficult
to prevent, unless barrier or deflective devises are in place.
4. &n=
bsp; More
likely to tie up emergency resources for a greater length of time, dependin=
g on
target focus, and strength of explosive.
5. &=
nbsp; More
likely to cause emergency worker stress, both at incident scene and from
post-traumatic shock.
6. &n=
bsp; More
likely to cause panic stress among the general public.
= <= o:p>
e. &n=
bsp; Transportation
Mode Crashing Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
1.&=
nbsp; High
priority private sector, governmental, and mass gathering facilities would =
be
the most likely targets for this method of terrorism.
&=
nbsp; 3. =
INDIVIDUAL
SELF DESTRUCTION (SUICIDE BOMBERS)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; a. =
Via
obvious explosive device.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
b.&=
nbsp; Via
hidden explosive device (underneath clothing, in foot-ware, in hand held
luggage or package).
&n=
bsp;  =
;
c.&=
nbsp; Individual
Self Destruction Advantages.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>1. =
All logical
listings under I. E. above.
2.&n= bsp;  = ; Almost impo= ssible to stop if explosives are hidden, and individual is not afraid of dieing. <= o:p>
3.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Has strong
negative psychological effect on local public, often leading to the tempora=
ry
disruption of activities in the immediate area.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'> &nbs=
p; 3. =
INDIVIDUAL
SELF DESTRUCTION (SUICIDE BOMBERS) (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; d. =
Individual
Self Destruction Opportunities in the C/WLEPD.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Major
commercial areas (mall, shopping centers, etc.)
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2. =
Mass
gathering facilities.
4.=
TACTICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF TERRORISM
=
&nbs=
p; a. =
Tactical
Nuclear Device
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Via
being delivered in person.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;
&nb=
sp; a.
Hidden in undisguised location.
&n=
bsp;  =
; b.
Hidden inside “innocent” common container.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2. =
Via
remote delivery (bomb, missile).
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. =
“Dirty”
Bomb (Conventional explosive device combined with radiation source to cause
long term contamination)
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp; c.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Tactical
Nuclear Weapons of Terrorism Advantages
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Very
high short term and long term casualty rate.
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp;  =
; 2. =
Makes
property affected virtually unusable because of effects of radiation.
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp;  =
; 3. =
Causes
great public stress, because of fall out effect as well as initial
psychological shock.
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp;  =
; 4.
=
Disrupts
fabric of community from social and economic standpoints.
&n=
bsp;  =
; 5. =
Overly
stresses Emergency Management, Emergency Communications, Emergency Response,
Public Health, and Hospital operations and personnel.
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp;  =
; 6. =
Create
additional private health, hospital, and public health problems because any
health symptoms or concerns among the general populace of the impacted area
being instantly related to the terrorist event.
G.=
TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; 7. =
Very
difficult to prevent, unless radiological monitoring devices have been used=
for
detection prior to the event.
&n=
bsp;  =
; e. =
Tactical
Nuclear Weapons of Destruction Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Because
of the required resources devoted to this form of terrorism and the desire =
to
create the most damage, it would be most likely used at a major mass gather=
ing
event location.
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> &n=
bsp; BIO-TERRORISM
WEAPONS
=
&nbs=
p; a. =
Examples
1. =
Anthrax
a.&= nbsp; An acute infections disease caused by the spore forming Bacillus antracus.<= o:p>
b. Not
contagious.
c. Cutan=
eous
(Skin) form is 95% curable.
d.=
=
Pulmonary
(inhalation) form is difficult to treat, but =
curable if diagnosed early. &nb=
sp; =
=
span>
e.=
=
Initial
symptoms, within seven days of infection, for the inhalation form are simil=
ar
to those of the common cold, followed in several days by severe breathing
problems and shock.
f. &n=
bsp; Initial
symptoms, within seven days of infection, of the
=
intestinal form are nausea, loss of appetite, vomiting and
=
fever, followed by abdominal pain, vomiting of blood and
=
severe diarrhea.
g.=
=
Early
treatment of exposure to the illness with specific antibiotics is essential=
for
all forms; delay lessons chances for survival.
h.=
=
A
vaccine is available for prevention, but is not
recommended by the US Public Health Service for the general public at
this time.
G. TERRORISTIC ACT DELIVE=
RY
CATAGORIES (Continued)
5. BIO-T=
ERRORISM
WEAPONS (Continued)
&nbs=
p; &nbs=
p; a. =
Examples
(Continued)
1. &n=
bsp; Anthrax
(Continued)
i.=
=
While
not easy to spread, a possible effective terrorism use would be the dispers=
al
of the bacteria in a dusting form through the HVAC system of an enclosed ma=
ss
gathering facility.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2.
=
Cholera
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; a. &n=
bsp; Acute,
diarrheal illness caused by bacterial infection of =
the intestines.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
;
b. Only =
about
5% of the cases are severe enough to cause =
possible death.
c.=
=
Severe
case symptoms are profuse watery diarrhea, vomiting, and leg cramps.
d.=
=
Death
can occur within hours of the onset of the sever
symptoms, from dehydration and shock, if not treated.
e.&=
nbsp;
=
Cholera
is spread through the contamination of potable
water and food.
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
f. Insertion
of the Cholera bacteria into a public water supply =
system is the most likely terrorism action.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;
g.=
=
Disruption
of the public wasetwater treatment operations could exacerbate the spread of
Cholera.
h.=
=
Once
there is awareness of Cholera, additional chlorine trea=
tment
of public water supply and boiling of or iodine treatment of well
water can help prevent the further spread of the disease.
i.=
=
Should food contaminat=
ion be
determined to be a possible
terrorism action, the further spread of the disease from that source=
can
be prevented thorough cooking and consumption of the food while hot and the
peeling of all fruit.
G. TERRORISTIC ACT DELIVE=
RY
CATAGORIES (Continued)
5. BIO-T=
ERRORISM
WEAPONS (Continued)
&nbs=
p; &nbs=
p; a. =
Examples
(Continued)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 2. =
Cholera
(Continued)
j.=
=
Preventive
vaccination when an outbreak has not been identified is not recommended bec=
ause
of the comparative short time effectiveness of the vaccine, and the general
unavailability of the vaccine at this time.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 3. =
Smallpox
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; a. &n=
bsp; The
disease is caused by the variola virus.
b.=
=
The
incubation period of the disease ranges from 7 to 17 days.
c.=
=
Initial
symptoms include high fever, fatigue, and head and backaches. Within two to
three days, a flat red rash, most prominent on the face, arms, and legs,
appears at the same rate.
d.=
=
Highly
contagious, following exposure the disease is spread by saliva droplets.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; &=
nbsp; e. &n=
bsp; Only
the United States and Russian Disease Control
Centers have the Smallpox germs.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; f. &n=
bsp; Vaccine
is readily available, and, if given within four days
of exposure, can lessen the severity=
or
even prevent illness.
g.=
=
There
is no known treatment for the more supportive therapy (intravenous fluids, =
pain
and fever medication, etc.), and antibiotics for any secondary bacterial
infections that occur.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; h. &n=
bsp; The
majority of Smallpox victims survive, but there is an
approximate 30% death rate for the
disease.
i.=
=
Some
immunity or resistance may exist in older United States citizens who receiv=
ed
vaccinations as children.
G.=
TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; a. =
Examples
(Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; 3. =
Smallpox
(Continued)
j.&=
nbsp; If
the Smallpox bacteria became available to terrorists, the most likely use w=
ould
be in a mist dispersed through the HVAC systems of an enclosed mass gatheri=
ng
facilities,
&nb=
sp; with
aerial spray dispersal over an open mass gathering facility also being a
possible method.
k. =
Secondary
terrorism benefits would come from the initial spread of the disease by tho=
se
infected, especially during the first week, when they are most infectious a=
nd
the defining symptoms may not be apparent.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 4. =
Pneumonic
Plague
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; a. &n=
bsp; The
disease is bacterial, found in rodents and their fleas.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; b. &n=
bsp; The
bacteria from the disease impacts the lungs.
c.=
=
The
disease is spread by face to face contact between humans through respirator
droplets.
d.=
=
Symptoms
are fever, headache, weakness, and cough productive of bloody or watery spu=
tum.
e.=
=
The
disease progresses over a 2 to 4 day period and may cause septic shock, and,
without early treatment, death.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; f. &n=
bsp; The
disease is treatable with specific antibiotics if
diagnosed early enough.
&n=
bsp;
h.=
=
Possible
terrorism use of this disease would be dispersal of a mist through the HVAC
systems of an enclosed mass gathering facility or dispersal of the disease =
in
an aerial spray over an open mass gathering facility.
G. TERRORISTIC ACT DELIVE=
RY
CATAGORIES (Continued)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; a. =
Examples
(Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; 5. =
Botulism
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; a. &n=
bsp; It
is a muscle paralyzing disease caused by a bacterial
=
toxin.
b.=
=
The three kinds of the
disease are food-borne, infant, and wound, with food-borne being the form f=
or
bio-terrorism use.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; c. =
Food-borne
botulism shows its symptoms most commonly&=
nbsp;
between 12 and 36 hours, but they can begin as early as 6
=
<=
/span> &nbs=
p; hours
or as late as 2 weeks.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;
d.=
=
Food-borne
botulism symptoms include double vision, blurred vision, drooping eyelids,
slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, muscle weakness that always descends
from the shoulders. This is followed by paralysis of the breathing muscles.=
e. Botul=
ism
cannot be spread from one person to another.
f.=
=
Botulism
antitoxin is maintained by the USPHS Center for Disease Control and is
effective in reducing the severity of the symptoms, if administered early
enough. Supportive care of weeks to months results in recovery for most
patients.
g.&=
nbsp; Possible
terrorism use of this disease could be the introduction of the disease bact=
eria
into food served at a mass gathering event through a vendor, or introductio=
n of
it into food at an organizational event.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 6. =
Ebola
Hemorrhagic Fever
a. Sever=
e,
often fatal viral infection illness caused by the
=
Ebola virus.
b. Trans=
mitted
by:
1.&=
nbsp; Direct
contact with secretions or blood of an infected person.
2. &=
nbsp; Direct
contact with objects, such as a needle, that
have
been infected with the virus.
G. TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; a. =
Examples
(Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 6. =
Ebola
Hemorrhagic Fever (Continued)
c. Initi=
al
common symptoms are high fever, headache, muscle =
aches, stomach pain, fatigue, and diarrhea.
d.=
=
Follow-up
common symptoms (within one week) are chest pain and shock, resulting in de=
ath
in most cases.
e.=
=
Difficult
to diagnose in early stages, because of commonality of symptoms with other
diseases.
f.=
=
Treatment,
by personnel wearing protective clothing, is
primarily supportive, such as balancing patient’s fluids and electrolytes, maintaining ox=
ygen
status and blood pressure, and treating for any complicating infections.
g.=
=
Terrorism
utilization would most likely be initiated through the introduction of the
virus in a spray through the HVAC system of an enclosed mass gathering
facility, with secondary infection spreading by natural contact with persons
infected, prior to the determination of the disease.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 7. =
Typhoid
Fever
a.=
=
Is
a bacterial infection carried in the blood stream and the inte=
stinal
tract of human beings.
b.=
=
Initial
contact with the disease is with human feces in drink or food.
c.=
=
Symptoms
are high fever (up to 104 degrees), weakness, stomach pains, headache, and =
loss
of appetite.
d.=
=
Test
of blood and stool for the bacteria will identify the disease.
e.=
=
An
effective vaccine for the disease is available, but the process of
administering the vaccine takes a minimum of one week.
5. =
BIO-TERRORISM
WEAPONS (Continued)
7. &n=
bsp; Typhoid
Fever (Continued)
f.=
=
Initial
recovery period is 2-7 days, with sound personal hygiene necessary during t=
he
total recovery period.
g.=
=
20%
of the long term untreated cases may die from =
complications of the infection.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;  =
; h. &n=
bsp; The
most likely terrorism action for this disease would be =
contamination of a tre=
ated
public water supply.
i. =
&nb=
sp;
A secondary
terrorism action for this disease would be the disruption of a public waste=
water
treatment system
&nb=
sp; upst=
ream
from a reasonably close other population center, through the release of untreated human feces
containing the disease bacteria.
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. =
Advantages
of Bio-terrorism Utilizing Typhoid Fever
&n=
bsp;  =
; &=
nbsp; 1. =
Relatively
easy to initiate, once the agent is secured.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Difficult
to detect in some instances, because of the delay between the act of terror=
ism
and the onset of the initial symptoms of the agent.
3.&=
nbsp; Creates
panic among the general public, especially in the area of the initial incid=
ent.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Creates
many casualties with little effort.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Stresses
Public Health and hospital operations.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 6.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Stresses
general population through disruption of normal life style.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 7.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Creates
secondary temporary economic problems through No. 6 above.
&n=
bsp;  =
; c. =
Possible
Bio-terrorism Attack Indicators of Typhoid Fever
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Marked
increase of illness with common complaints impacting population.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
5. =
BIO-TERRORISM
WEAPONS (Continued)
c.=
Possible
Bio-terrorism Attack Indicators of Typhoid Fever (Continued)
2.&=
nbsp; Presence
of a large number of insects or unusual insects.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Presence
of large number of dead wild and domestic animals.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Evidence
of unscheduled low flying aircraft dispersing fogs, mists, or sprays.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Evidence
of physical intrusion at facilities in the bio-terrorism spectrum (water and
wastewater treatment facilities, laboratory facilities having bio-terrorism
resources, mass feeding food preparation facilities, etc.).
&n=
bsp;  =
;
d.=
Individual
Preventive Measures Regarding Typhoid Fever
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Research
the health history of self and direct antecedents.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Maintain
sound physical condition through diet and exercise and other good health
habits.
&n=
bsp;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Take
advantage of available immunization opportunities, as recommended by public
health authorities.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Maintain
good personal hygiene practices, including hand washing.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
e.&=
nbsp; Bio-terrorism
Threat Opportunities for Utilization of Typhoid Fever in the C/WLEPD
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Significant
governmental, educational, industrial, business, and commercial enclosed
facilities thorough HVAC systems and common area contamination.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Significant
food preparation, serving, and vending operations through contamination of =
offered
items.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Mass gathering events
through HVAC systems or aerial dispersal, contamination of food vending
supplies, and common area contamination.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&nbs=
p; 4. =
General
population through contamination of public water supply and aerial dispersa=
l.
G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&nbs=
p; 6. =
CHEMICAL
TERRORISM
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; a. &n=
bsp; Chemical
Terrorism Agent Classification
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Nerve
– Impacts the nervous system components.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2. =
Blood-
Deprives transfer of oxygen to other cells.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 3. =
Blister
– Irritates cells.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 4. =
Choking
– Interferes with inhalation process.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 5. =
Vomiting
– Produces Nausea followed by severe vomiting (usually preceded by a
runny nose, sneezing and coughing)
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 6. =
Incapacitating
– Temporarily acutely interferes with normal physical or thought proc=
ess
=
&nbs=
p; b. =
Examples
of Chemicals Suitable for Terrorism Purposes
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
VX
(Nerve) =
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2. =
Carbon
Monoxide (Blood)
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 3. =
Hydrogen
Cyanide (Blood)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 4. =
Cyanogen
Chloride (Blood)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 5. =
Cyanogen
Bromide (Blood)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 6. =
Phosgene
Oxime (CX) (Blister)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 7. =
Sulfur
Mustards (Blister)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 8. =
Nitrogen
Mustards (Blister)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 9. =
Lewisite
(Blister)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 10. Chlor=
ine
(Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 11. Ammon=
ia
(Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 12. Methyl
Isocyanite (MIC) Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 13. Ogano=
phosphate
Insecticide (Choking)
&nbs=
p; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 14. Phos=
gene
(Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 15. Dipho=
sgene
(Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 16. Chlor=
opicin
(Choking)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 18. Tear =
Gas
(Incapacitating)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 20. Mace
(Incapacitating)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 21. Pepper
Spray (Incapacitating)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 22. BZ
(Incapacitating)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 23. Adams=
ite
(DM) (Vomiting)
G. TERRORISTIC ACT DELIVE=
RY
CATAGORIES (Continued)
6. =
CHEMICAL
TERRORISM (Continued)
&nbs=
p; c.&=
nbsp; Chemical
Terrorism Advantages
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 1. =
Relatively
easy to acquire and/or produce.
&nbs=
p;
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 2. =
Creates
many casualties with little effort.
&nbs=
p;
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 3. =
Difficult
to detect in some instances.
&nbs=
p;
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 4. =
Creates
panic in the impacted area.
&nbs=
p;
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 5. =
Disrupts
and stresses normal emergency response and hospital operations and personne=
l.
&nbs= p;
d. &n=
bsp; Possible
Chemical Terrorism Indicators
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 1. =
Emission
vapor cloud (Outside).
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 2. =
Significant
uncommon abnormal odor (Outside/Inside).
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
&nbs=
p; 3. =
Multiple
victim acute physical distress symptoms (Inside/Outside).
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&nbs=
p; 4. =
Multiple
unconscious or dead victims without obvious trauma.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 5. =
Significant
uncommon color of and/or odor from waterways.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 6. =
Significant
dead insects, animals, birds, or fish.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 7. =
Significant
dead plant life.
&nbs=
p;
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 8. =
Explosion
that has insignificant damage from the explosion itself, but dispense liqui=
ds,
mists, or gas.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 9. =
Unscheduled
and/or unusual spray being disseminated.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 10. Aband=
oned
spray devices.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; e. =
Chemical
Terrorism Threat Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; 1. =
Mass
Gathering Facilities
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; a. Directly via aerial or surface dis=
persal
(Open)
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&nbs=
p; 6. =
CHEMICAL
TERRORISM (Continued)
e.=
Chemical
Terrorism Threat Opportunities in the C/WLEPC (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. Through HVAC system (Enclosed)
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.
=
Urban
areas down wind of ruptured relevant chemical storage vessels.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; a.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; &nb=
sp; b. Truck tank
&n=
bsp;  =
; f. &=
nbsp; Chemical
Terrorism Detection Devices
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Improved
Chemical Agent Monitor-Detector
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
M18A2
and M256 Chemical Agent Detector Kits
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Various
enzyme tickets
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
M8
and M9 Detection Papers
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Detector
tubes
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 6.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Pesticide
tickets
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&nbs=
p; 7. =
Electronic
meters
&n=
bsp; 7.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
ASSASSINATION
TERRORISM
=
&nbs=
p; a. =
Assassination
of Key Individual
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Political
Figure (Domestic or foreign act of terrorism)
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Other
Figure (Domestic act of terrorism)
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
May
be political, ideological, or personal.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Initiated
by organization or individual.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
b.=
Assassination
of Random Group Members
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Most
likely domestic act of personal terrorism by member of same group (Educatio=
nal
facility, workplace, family unit, etc.).
2. &n=
bsp; May
end with suicide of perpetrator.
G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&nbs=
p; 7. =
ASSASSINATION
TERRORISM (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. =
Assassination
of Random Group Members (Continued)
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
May
be random appearing “theme” or “serial” killings ba=
sed
upon assassin’s decision only.
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Most
likely a domestic perpetuator.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
c.=
Advantages
of Assassination Terrorism
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Difficult
to predict.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Difficult
to protect victim from dedicated assassin who does not care about survival.=
&n=
bsp;  =
;
3.&=
nbsp; Inexpensive.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp;
4.&=
nbsp; Requires
little expertise, except for professional assassination of key political fi=
gure
where the assassin does not wish to be apprehended.
5.&=
nbsp; Random
serial acts have strong mass economic and psychological impact.
&n=
bsp;  =
; d. =
Assassination
Terrorism Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Visit
of high ranking federal or state official.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Visit
of celebrity.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Appearance
of key local government official.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Other
opportunities in the eyes of the assassin.
e.=
Assassination
Terrorism Weapons
&nbs=
p; 1. =
Firearms
&nbs=
p; 2. =
Bomb/Grenade
(hand or rifle)
&nbs=
p; 8. =
ARSON
TERRORISM
&nbs=
p; &nbs=
p; a. =
Arson
terrorism differs from ordinary criminal arson because of purpose, a
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; political
goal, rather than an economic one.
&nbs=
p;
G. &n=
bsp; TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued)
&nbs=
p; 8. =
ARSON
TERRORISM (Continued)
b. Arson
terrorism is a favorite domestic terrorism method (Women’s clinics,
minority
structures of worship, etc.).
&n=
bsp;  =
; c. =
Methods
of Committing Arson
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Placing
accelerant directly at the focus of the act of arson for immediate ignition=
&n= bsp; 2.<= span style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> = Combining an auxiliary fuel source with accelerant at the focus of the act of arson.<= o:p>
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Using
a timing device of some sort combined with an ignition device to provide a
delayed ignition at the focus point.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Using
a fire bomb (Molotov Cocktail or similar device) to ignite the focus point =
from
a remote location.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Using
a projectile (bullet, anti-tank or anti-aircraft rocket, rifle grenade, etc=
.)
as the igniter device, with the focus point target furnishing the fuel.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
d.=
Advantages
of Arson Terrorism
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
It
is a simple procedure (ignition device + fuel).
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
The
two components are readily available.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
No
training is needed for committing basic arson terrorism.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
It
is difficult to prevent.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Because
of the usual stealth factor, the perpetrator has a good chance of at least
initially escaping the consequences of the act.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 6.
=
It
can be a “bonus” effect of other forms of terrorism (explosive
devices, nuclear devices, etc.)
&n=
bsp; 7.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
It
often destroys any meaningful evidence of the act, making ultimate detection
and apprehension of the perpetrator difficult.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
G.=
TERRORISTIC
ACT DELIVERY CATAGORIES (Continued) &n=
bsp;
8. &n=
bsp; ARSON
TERRORISM (Continued)
e.=
Arson
Terrorism Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Hate
crime facilities (Women’s clinics, minority structures of worship, ho=
mes
of “unwanted” persons, etc.)
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Any
structure of terrorism significance that would benefit from the
“bonus” of the delivery of a remote explosive igniter (rocket,
rifle grenade, mortar shell, bullet).
&n=
bsp; 9.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
TECHNOLOGICAL
TERRORISM
=
&nbs=
p; a. =
Primary
Options
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Disruption
of computerized and related electronic control and record systems through t=
he
introduction of a computer virus.
a.=
=
Communications
– Emergency communications systems, aircraft control systems, commerc=
ial
communications systems, etc.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. &n=
bsp; Public
Health and Safety – Water treatment processing and =
=
delivery,
wastewater treatment and delivery, traffic control
si=
gnals
programming, etc.
c.=
=
Key
Record Systems – Taxes, fees, banking and investment, credit, court
records, public and higher education, private sector billing, etc.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 2. =
Disruption
of computerized and related electronic control and record systems through t=
he
introduction of false information.
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. =
Advantages
of Technological Terrorism
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Can
be accomplished off site, making detection and apprehension of a perpetrator
difficult.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Costly
to defend against, requiring often times highly sophisticated and time
consuming safeguards.
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Can
transfer its disruptive programming to other sites automatically in some ca=
ses.
&nbs=
p; 4.
=
Has
a high benefit to cost factor.
9. &=
nbsp; TECHNOLOGICAL
TERRORISM (Continued)
&n=
bsp;  =
; b. =
Advantages
of technological Terrorism (Continued)
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Can
be beneficial in conjunction with other categories of terrorism.
&n=
bsp;
c.=
Technological
Terrorism Opportunities in the C/WLEPD
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; 1. =
Terrorism
sensitive manufacturing facilities.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 2.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Emergency
management and emergency communications operations.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 3.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Local
government tax records.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 4.
=
Local
government property records.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 5.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Public
utility operations.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 6.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Banking
and investment records.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 7.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Traffic
control signal operations.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 8.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Air
traffic control operations.
&n=
bsp;  =
;
&n=
bsp; 9.<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:1'> =
Commercial
billing records.
&n=
bsp;  =
; a. =
Initiate
an internal analysis of the acts of terrorism that could impact the
&n=
bsp;  =
; &n=
bsp; facility/=
organization.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>b. =
Identify, a=
ssess,
and prioritize facility/organizational shortfall in the prevention, mitigat=
ion,
and control of possible acts of terrorism that could impact the
facility/organization.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>c. =
Develop pro=
grams,
policies, and procedures to overcome the shortfalls
in “b.” above.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>d. =
Prepare or =
expand
existing facility/organization Emergency Operation Plan to include acts of
terrorism.
<=
span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>e. =
Prepare a
facility/organizational Anti-terrorism Policies and Procedures
Manual or chapter in an existing manual of polic=
ies
and procedures.
f. &nbs= p; Participate in terrorism intelligence sharing organization based upon the C/WLEPC that would include relevant law enforcement agencies serving the District, inclu= ding relevant federal and State of West Virginia agencies.
g.&=
nbsp; Participate
in an intelligence sharing organization based upon similar work focus.
h.&=
nbsp; Maintain a relation sh=
ip
through the organizations mentioned in “f.” and “g.”
above with the relevant State of West Virginia Homeland Defense agency.
i.&=
nbsp; Provide
in-depth training about terrorism for all organizational senior management =
and
security personnel.
j.&=
nbsp; Provide
a minimum of basic training about terrorism for all non-security and senior
management personnel.
k. &nbs= p; Provide continual training on the subject of Terrorism for all Emergency Management, Emergency Communications, Emergency Response, Public Health, and Hospital personnel, in order to help them assimilate the constantly expanding knowle= dge of the subject.
l.&=
nbsp; Provide
the general public with periodic updates concerning Terrorism to help preve=
nt
erroneous information on the subject from causing panic and unnecessary str=
ess.
m.&=
nbsp; Protect
security sensitive information, while still complying with the provision of
employee and community right-to-know information legal
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; requirements.
n.&=
nbsp; Destroy
security sensitive solid waste (paperwork, product, etc.)
= completely to prevent possible intelligence analysis by terrorists.<= o:p>
o.&=
nbsp; Prevent
sensitive computer files from technological theft by terrorists for
intelligence analysis purposes, by installation of effective program entry
safeguards.
p.&=
nbsp; Provide
training for employees working in security sensitive areas to be aware of
abnormal behavior by other employees and visitors in or near such areas.
2.=
PHYSICAL FACILITY TERRORISM SECURITY OPTIONS
a.&=
nbsp; Install
fencing and/or other barrier devices around facility and inside facility ar=
ound
critical security areas.
b. &nbs= p; Strengthen vehicular entries with gates and/or barriers to prevent the ability of a terrorist to crash through existing vehicular entries in order to commit an= act of terrorism.
c.&=
nbsp; Strengthen
or install barriers around critical buildings or other structures within a
facility to prevent or minimize acts of terrorism involving explosives on s=
ite
or delivered remotely.
d.&=
nbsp; Install
door locks on all buildings sensitive to terrorist actions, that can only be
opened by authorized key card holders.
e.&=
nbsp; Place
underground communications and electrical utility lines now overhead.
f.&=
nbsp; Provide
security lighting at exterior boundaries and within facility as needed to a=
id
in the prevention of unauthorized movement.
g.&=
nbsp; Prohibit
on street parking adjacent to major terrorism sensitive facilities.
h.&=
nbsp; Remove
interior facility parking adjacent to buildings and other sensitive structu=
res.
H.=
ACTIONS
FOR THE PREVENTION, MITIGATION, AND CONTROL OF ACTS
OF TERRORISM (Continued)
2.=
PHYSICAL FACILITY TERRORISM SECURITY OPTIONS
i.&=
nbsp; Relocate
of extremely hazardous material to a point where it is not readily availabl=
e to
terrorists (existing or new underground storage, existing or new facility
interior structure, etc.).
&nb=
sp; j. &=
nbsp; Eliminate
extremely hazardous material in facility operation.
k.&=
nbsp; Install,
operate, and monitor remote controlled television cameras to cover critical
security locations.
l.&=
nbsp; Utilize
qualified security personnel and dogs for the patrol of critical security
locations.
3.=
FACILITY HUMAN ENTRY SECURITY OPTIONS
a.&=
nbsp; Review
and analyze all existing employee files to assure knowledge of background,
within federal and state laws, regulations, and guidelines.
b.&=
nbsp; Initiate
stringent screening, including background checks, of all new employee
candidates prior to employment within federal and state laws, regulations, =
and
guidelines.
&nbs=
p; c. =
Issue
photo identification badges or similar devices to all employees.
=
d. &n=
bsp; Initiate
security screening and visitor badging of all visitors, including utilizati=
on
of metal detection devices and examination of business luggage and handbags=
.
e.&=
nbsp; Initiate
visitor badging and escort of all service personnel from outside contractor=
s by
a responsible employee.
Terrorism
threats are a form of terrorism in itself. All terrorists threats should be
taken seriously.
There
is no way to assure which threats are real and which are hoaxes. Therefore,=
it
is necessary to have a procedure to resolve all threat actions.
1.&n=
bsp;  =
;
All threats should be immediately reported to gover=
nmental
authorities through the appropriate E-911 Communications Center.
I. &=
nbsp; TERRORISM
THREATS (Continued)
2.&n=
bsp;  =
;
Occupants o=
f the
facility(ies) that would be impacted by the threat should always<=
/u>
be evacuated from the facility(ies) to a safe location as quickly as possib=
le.
3.1 If th=
ere is
no physical evidence that the threat is real at the location referred to by=
the
threat, the appropriate E-911 Communications Center will dispatch an
appropriate law enforcement unit to evaluate the situation at the subject
location, to see if the Incident meets the FBI’s definition of a
terrorism creditable threat.
a. =
If
the incident analysis by the local law enforcement unit shows that it does =
meet
the FBI’s definition of a terrorism creditable threat, the procedure =
in
3.2 is followed.
b.=
=
If
the incident analysis by the local law enforcement unit does not show that =
it
meets the FBI’s definition of a terrorism creditable threat, local law
enforcement would use either:
(1). &n=
bsp; Normal
department SOP, or
(2). General
Emergency Response Plan procedures including the NIMS concepts, as describe=
d in
Chapter VI of this ERP with the ranking available law enforcement officer of
the jurisdiction serving as the IC, at the request of the ranking available
fire service officer of the jurisdiction.
3.2 If th=
ere is
physical evidence that there is an actual evidence of the intent of a
terroristic action or that a terroristic action has been initiated at the
location referred to by the threat:
a.=
=
The
relevant E-911 Communications Center shall dispatch appropriate law enforce=
ment
personnel to the site to:
1. &n=
bsp; Verify
that the Incident meets the FBI’s definition of terrorism.
2. &n=
bsp; Establish
an initial Incident Command Post.
3. &n=
bsp; Assist
with the orderly evacuation of any persons at the Incident Site to a safe z=
one.
&nbs=
p; 4. =
Establish
a security perimeter at the edge of the safe zone.
5. =
Pass
on the request of the initial IC to activate the County EOR.
I. &=
nbsp; TERRORISM
THREATS (Continued)
&=
nbsp; 3.2 (Cont=
inued)
=
b. =
The relevant
E-911 Communications Center shall dispatch appropriate
&nb= sp; fire= /rescue and EMS personnel and apparatus/equipment to a Staging Area, after initial = sign in at the Reception Station, designated by the initial Incident Commander.<= o:p>
c.=
=
The
relevant E-911 Communications Center shall notify the WV State Police of the
terrorist situation as mandated by State law and regulations.
d. The W=
VSP
shall:
1. &n=
bsp; Notify
the relevant FBI Field Office Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the terrorism
incident.
&n=
bsp;  =
; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; 2. =
Notify
the WVDES and HS Director of the terrorism incident.
3. =
Notify
the WV State Fire Marshal of the terrorism incident.
4. &n=
bsp; Activate
the Crisis Management Task Force and the Crisis Management Operations Plan.=
5. &n=
bsp; Notify
the local law enforcement IC of the ETA of when the WVSP Threat Management =
Team
will arrive to assume Incident Command with the WVSP JOC, with the head of =
the
Team acting as the WVSP OSC until the FBI OSC arrives at the ICP to take
overall command of the Incident.
6. &n=
bsp; Dispatch
appropriate personnel to the Staging Area to be available to take appropria=
te
action as directed by the WVSP Threat Management Team headed by the WVSP OS=
C.
e.=
=
The
FBI Field Office SAC shall notify the WVSP of the ETA of the FBI OSC at the=
JOC
to assume overall incident command.
f. The
FBI OSC, upon arrival, shall:
(1). Assume
overall incident command at the JOC
(2). Reque=
st
appropriate assistance from other federal agencies
(3). Utilize the existing experti=
se
of the local government and state government resources available at the JOC,
the WVOES EOC and the relevant County EOR.
I. &=
nbsp; TERRORISM
THREATS (Continued)
&=
nbsp; 3.2 (Cont=
inued)
f. The
FBI OSC, upon arrival, shall: (Continued)
Note:=
b> &nbs=
p; Major
facilities may have internal terrorism threat procedures. This section of t=
he
C/WLEPC Plan does not replace such procedures, but rather sets forth off-si=
te
emergency response procedures to compliment and integrate with major facili=
ty
threat procedures.
J. &nb=
sp; TERRORISM
THREAT INVESTIGATION
1. =
Terrorism
threat investigation shall be made for the purposes of determining;
=
a=
. =
The
existence of the intent to commit an act of terrorism or the initiation of =
such
an act.
=
b=
. =
The
location and other pertinent information about the intent to commit an act =
of
terrorism or the initiation of such an act.
=
&nb=
sp; c. =
Whether
the intent to commit an act of terrorism or the initiation of such an act m=
eets
the FBI’s definition of terrorism, taking into consideration any writ=
ten
or oral threats received relating to the act.
&nbs=
p; 2. =
Threat
investigation shall initially be made, with the assistance of appropriate l=
aw
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; Enforcement
agency as logical, by the logical most qualified personnel from:
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; a. =
The
jurisdiction where the incident takes place.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; b. =
The
adjacent jurisdiction.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; c. =
The
State of West Virginia.
&nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; d. =
The
United States government.
Note: R=
equests
for personnel from the State of West Virginia or the federal government sha=
ll
be requested through the WVDES and HS.
K. CONCLUSION
Domestic and foreign
terrorism are a real possibility in the C/WLEPD. Steps can be taken by
facilities and security personnel and locally based federal, state, county =
and
municipal personnel to help prevent and control terrorism activities. A
comprehensive program of terrorism prevention, mitigation and control as
discussed above will markedly limit the opportunity for terrorism acts to be
successful in the C/WLEPD. All the above aspects should be implemented to t=
he
greatest extent possible, given the accelerating rate of terrorism acts in =
the
United States and the potential for the continuation of that acceleration
unless pro-active measures are taken.
CHAPTER XII
TERRORISM PREVENTION AND CONTROL PLAN=
REVISED - SEPTEMBER 2=
005
1=